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A. Introduction 
5.01 Delayed prosecutions of sexual offences continue to generate publicity and controversy,1 and 
to raise difficult and conflicting issues. On the one hand, as a result of the passage of time, a 
defendant on trial for ‘historical sexual offences’ might well encounter significant forensic 
disadvantage in defending himself. Such disadvantage might stem, for example, from ‘the 
fact that any potential witnesses have died or are not able to be located’2 or from ‘the fact that 
any potential evidence has been lost or is otherwise unavailable.’3 ‘Obviously,’ the Court of 
Appeal has noted, ‘as a matter of commonsense, if someone is facing allegations relating to 
events that have occurred a long time ago there will be difficulties in recollection, not only 
for those who make the allegations but for those who have to defend themselves against 
them.’4 On the other hand, delays in making complaints of offences of this nature might be 
                                                          
1
 See, e.g., Topping, A. (2014). ‘Historic Sex Case Prosecutions Will Continue, Vows Chief Prosecutor.’ The 
Guardian, 20 February, online; Gibb, F. (2014). ‘Prosecutors Pledge Fresh Pursuit of Historical Abuse Cases.’ 
The Times. 27 February, online; Pidd, H. (2014). ‘DPP Defends Failed Prosecutions of Celebrities over Historic 
Sex Claims.’ The Guardian, 27 February, online; Hamilton, F., Gibb, F., Simpson, J., and Pitel, L. (2014). 
‘Prosecutors in Dock as Sex Case MP Is Cleared.’ The Times, 11 April, online; Mason, R. and Bowcott, O. 
(2014). ‘Attorney General Demands Answers from CPS over Failed Sex Offence Cases.’ The Guardian, 11 
April, online; Mason, R., Halliday, J., and Pidd, H. (2014). ‘CPS Defends Decision to Bring Assault and Rape 
Charges against Nigel Evans.’ The Guardian, 11 April, online; Rustin, S. (2014). ‘Alison Saunders, Director of 
Public Prosecutions: “I Think Women Have Had, as Witnesses and Victims, a Raw Deal.”’ The Guardian, 2 
May, online. 
2
 Evidence Act 1995 (New South Wales), s. 165B(7)(a); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011, s. 
165B(7)(a). 
3
 Evidence Act 1995 (New South Wales), s 165B(7)(b); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011, s. 
165B(7)(b). 
4R v M (Brian) [2007] EWCA Crim 1182 [17]. 
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perfectly understandable: ‘Some victims of sexual abuse may not feel confident or strong 
enough to report until many years after the abuse has taken place, and often not until they are 
adults. This delay in reporting can be for a wide range of reasons ...’.5 The task of ensuring 
that relevant legal principles accommodate these conflicting considerations is a complex one. 
This chapter examines one such principle: the abuse of process doctrine.6 
B. Why the abuse of process doctrine is the chief mechanism 
for protecting defendants charged with sexual offences 
5.02 It is worth clarifying two points which explain why the abuse of process doctrine is the chief 
mechanism potentially protecting defendants charged with sexual offencesafter undue delay 
from facing trial. 
(1) No time limit 
5.03 While section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 prevents a magistrates’ court from 
trying an information unless it was laid within six months of the commission of the offence, 
no time limit of this nature applies to the commencement of trials on indictment (which are 
the forum in which prosecutions of sexual offences will be tried). 
(2) Limited applicability of right to be tried within a reasonable time 
5.04 The second point is that the right to be tried ‘within a reasonable time’, guaranteed by article 
6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and made directly enforceable in 
domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998, has limited applicability in the present context. 
This right has generated a very large volume of jurisprudence from Strasbourg; indeed, it was 
commented in 2007 that ‘[l]ength of judicial proceedings is ... the issue that has most 
                                                          
5
 Crown Prosecution Service (2013). Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases of Child Sexual Abuse Issued by the 
Director of Public Prosecutions [96]. See also R v Wright (Amersham Crown Court, 6 February 2014) 
(sentencing remarks); R v Cullen (Derby Crown Court, 24 March 2014) (sentencing remarks); R v Clifford 
(Southwark Crown Court, 2 May 2014) (sentencing remarks). 
6
 I have drawn here on some of my earlier analyses in Choo, A. L.-T. (2008). Abuse of Process and Judicial 
Stays of Criminal Proceedings. 2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch 3. 
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occupied the European Court of Human Rights in quantitative terms – so much so that since 
1968 it has accounted for almost 30% of the judgments handed down by the Court’.7 In terms 
of the implications of the right, the Strasbourg Court has explained that, 
. . . in criminal matters, the ‘reasonable time’ referred to in Article 6, §1, begins to run as soon 
as a person is ‘charged’; this may occur on a date prior to the case coming before the trial 
court . . ., such as the date of arrest, the date when the person concerned was officially notified 
that he would be prosecuted, or the date when preliminary investigations were opened . . . 
‘Charge’, for the purposes of Article 6, §1, may be defined as ‘the official notification given 
to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal 
offence’, a definition that also corresponds to the test whether ‘the situation of the [suspect] 
has been substantially affected’.8 
In essence, therefore, it is only delay after the defendant has been officially notified in some 
way of the relevant allegation against him or her that falls within the scope of the right to be 
tried within a reasonable time.9 Delayed prosecutions of sexual offences, however, are 
typically caused by delay occurring well before that stage. For this reason, the right is of 
limited significance in the present context. 
C.The abuse of process doctrine: general principles 
5.05 The judicial power to stay criminal proceedings which constitute an abuse of the process of 
the court10 is well established, having being refined in modern times by the House of Lords in 
                                                          
7
 Edel, F. (2007). The Length of Civil and Criminal Proceedings in the Case-Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights. 2nd edn, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 6. 
8
 Korshunov v Russia , App no 38971/06 (ECtHR, 25 October 2007) [68], quoting from Deweer v Belgium 
(1980) 2 EHRR 439 [46]. 
9
 Relatively recent authorities in which such a right is discussed include Boolell v State of Mauritius [2006] 
UKPC 46, [2012] 1 WLR 3718; Tapper v DPP of Jamaica  [2012] UKPC 26, [2012] 1 WLR 2712; Celine v 
State of Mauritius [2012] UKPC 32, [2012] 1 WLR 3707; Rummun v State of Mauritius [2013] UKPC 6, [2013] 
1 WLR 598. 
10
 See generally Choo, A. L.-T. (2008), cited above at n.6; Wells., C. (2011). Abuse of Process. 2nd edn, Bristol: 
Jordan Publishing; Young, D., Summers,  M. and Corker, D. (2014). Abuse of Process in Criminal Proceedings. 
4th edn, Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury Professional. 
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Connelly v DPP11and in subsequent cases such as R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, 
ex p Bennett,12R v Latif,13 and R v Looseley,14 and, most recently, by the Supreme Court in R 
v Maxwell.15 The abuse of process doctrine is considered to have two limbs. In the words of 
Lord Dyson JSC: 
It is well established that the court has the power to stay proceedings in two categories of 
case, namely (i) where it will be impossible to give the accused a fair trial, and (ii) where it 
offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the 
particular circumstances of the case. In the first category of case, if the court concludes that an 
accused cannot receive a fair trial, it will stay the proceedings without more. No question of 
the balancing of competing interests arises. In the second category of case, the court is 
concerned to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system. Here a stay will be granted 
where the court concludes that in all the circumstances a trial will offend the court’s sense of 
justice and propriety ... or will undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system and 
bring it into disrepute . . .16 
5.06 It is clear that the concern of the first limb is with epistemic considerations. A ‘fair trial’, 
therefore, may be seen as one which facilitates accurate fact-finding or truth discovery; its 
concern is with what Bentham called ‘rectitude of decision’.17 To put it simply, pursuant to 
the first limb, criminal proceedings may be stayed to prevent the wrongful conviction of an 
innocent person. This reflects a recognition that ‘[p]eople have’, as Dworkin has explained, ‘a 
profound right not to be convicted of crimes of which they are innocent’.18 In the words of 
another commentator, ‘[t]he extreme unfairness of depriving a person of freedom for an 
                                                          
11[1964] AC 1254. 
12[1994] 1 AC 42. 
13[1996] 1 WLR 104. 
14
 [2001] UKHL 53, [2001] 1 WLR 2060. 
15[2010] UKSC 48, [2011] 1 WLR 1837. See also the decision of the Privy Council in Warren v Attorney 
General for Jersey [2011] UKPC 10, [2012] 1 AC 22. 
16R v Maxwell[2010] UKSC 48, [2011] 1 WLR 1837 [13]. 
17Bentham, J. (1827). Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice (5 vols). London: 
Hunt and Clarke, vol. i (reprinted New York: Garland Publishing, 1978) 1. 
18Dworkin, R. (1986). A Matter of Principle. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 72. 
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offense she did not commit is beyond dispute’.19 The second limb of the abuse of process 
doctrine, on the other hand, has at its root deontological concerns with values that are 
unrelated to the promotion or achievement of accurate fact-finding. This limb therefore 
‘represents a political-moral judgment that certain values are more important than accuracy in 
fact-finding. As such, it limits the truth that is allowed to appear at trial in favour of social 
goals which transcend the importance of factual truth.’20 A trial may be stayed on the basis of 
the second (and, arguably, more controversial21) limb of the abuse of process doctrine not 
because of any danger that to allow the prosecution to continue may result in an inaccurate 
verdict, but because to do so may undermine particular values that are deemed worthy of 
protection. 
5.07 With these underlying considerations in mind,22 we may proceed now to the main focus of 
this chapter: the operation of the abuse of process doctrine in the context of delayed 
prosecutions. 
 
D. The abuse of process doctrine and delayed prosecutions 
5.08 The decision on abuse of process and delay in A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1990)23has been 
followed by over two decades’ worth of further case law from the Court of Appeal on the 
                                                          
19
 Tomkovicz, J. J. (2011). Constitutional Exclusion: The Rules, Rights, and Remedies that Strike the Balance 
between Freedom and Order. New York: Oxford University Press, 82. 
20
 Burns, R. P.(1999). A Theory of the Trial. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 95. 
21
 Non-epistemic considerations that are said to underlie particular principles of evidence and procedure have 
been the subject of much discussion and debate: see, eg Pizzi, W. T. (1999). Trials without Truth: Why Our 
System of Criminal Trials Has Become an Expensive Failure and What We Need to Do to Rebuild It. New York: 
New York University Press; Laudan, L. (2006). Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal 
Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
22
 For a fuller discussion of epistemic and non-epistemic justifications in the law of criminal evidence and 
procedure, see Choo, A. L.-T. (2013). The Privilege against Self-Incrimination and Criminal Justice, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, pp.3-10. 
23
 [1992] QB 630. 
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subject. In R v F (S),24 the Court, sitting with five judges, sought to clarify the principles that 
trial judges ought to apply when faced with abuse of process applications in the context of 
delay.25 The Court expressed the view that the instant decision as well as three of its previous 
decisions – R v Galbraith,26 A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1990),27 and R v S (S P)28 – ‘contain all 
the necessary discussion about the applicable principles’ and ‘[n]o further citation of 
authority is needed’.29 The principles that were thought to be encapsulated in these four 
decisions were summarized as follows: 
(i) An application to stay for abuse of process on grounds of delay and a submission 
of ‘no case to answer’ are two distinct matters. They must receive distinct and 
separate consideration. . . . 
(ii) An application to stay for abuse of process on the grounds of delay must be 
determined in accordance with Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 1990) [1992] 
QB 630. It cannot succeed unless, exceptionally, a fair trial is no longer possible 
owing to prejudice to the defendant occasioned by the delay which cannot fairly be 
addressed in the normal trial process. The presence or absence of explanation or 
justification for the delay is relevant only in so far as it bears on that question. . . . 
(iii) An application to stop the case on the grounds that there is no case to answer 
must be determined in accordance with R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039. For the 
reasons there explained, it is dangerous to ask the question in terms of whether a 
conviction would be safe, or the jury can safely convict, because that invites the judge 
to evaluate the weight and reliability of the evidence, which is the task of the jury. 
                                                          
24
 [2011] EWCA Crim 1844, [2012] QB 703. See generally Samuels, A. (2013). ‘Abuse of Process Applications 
– A Tougher Stance’. 177 Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 154. 
25
 For earlier discussion, see Choo, A. L.-T. (2008), cited above at n.6 (pp.77-80). 
26
 [1981] 1 WLR 1039. 
27
 [1992] QB 630. 
28
 [2006] EWCA Crim 756, [2006] 2 Cr App R 23. 
29
 [2011] EWCA Crim 1844, [2012] QB 703 [47]. The Court also clarified the implications of R v B [2003] 
EWCA Crim 319, [2003] 2 Cr App R 13 and R v Smolinski [2004] EWCA Crim 1270, [2004] 2 Cr App R 40. 
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The question is whether the evidence, viewed overall, is such that the jury could 
properly convict. . . . 
(iv) There is no different R v Galbraith test for offences which are alleged to have 
beencommitted some years ago, whether or not they are sexual offences . . . 
(v) An application to stay for abuse of process ought ordinarily to be heard and 
determined atthe outset of the case, and before the evidence is heard, unless there is a 
specific reason todefer it because the question of prejudice and fair trial can better be 
determined at a laterstage . . .30 
5.09 R v F (S) is undeniably an important decision. In particular, it provides valuable guidance 
onthe distinction between stay applications and submissions of no case to answer that are 
made pursuant to R v Galbraith, and on the implications of this distinction. It also confirms 
that stays for delay are to be granted in exceptional circumstances only; the normal situation 
would be for the trial to proceed and for reliance to be placed on the protections available in 
the course of the trial. Such protections would consist primarily of the exclusion of particular 
evidence considered to have been ‘tainted’ by the delay, and the delivery of ‘care warnings’ 
to the jury. Two aspects of R v F (S), however, deserve comment.  
5.10 First, and more broadly, the decision appears to confirm that only epistemic considerations 
would justify a stay of proceedings on the basis of delay. This may be too narrow an 
approach: it may be 
. . . argued that there is also a case for not holding a trial where it is no longer fair on the 
participants to require them to recount events and account for actions so far in the past. One of 
the purposes of criminal proceedings is not simply to establish whether the accused 
committed the offence charged but also to engage with the accused and hold him or her to 
                                                          
30
 [2011] EWCA Crim 1844, [2012] QB 703 [48]. 
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account for certain actions. This view . . . would suggest that proceedings should be stopped 
when it is no longer possible for defendants to be called to account for events because they 
can no longer relate to the events at that period of time in their life.31 
5.11 The second point is that R v F (S) leaves the position concerning the burden and standard of 
proof in abuse of process applications uncertain. The Court does not address the issue itself, 
but it is addressed in two of the three earlier decisions specifically endorsed by the Court. In 
A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 1990), Lord Lane CJ, reading the opinion of the Court of Appeal, 
stated that ‘no stay should be imposed unless the defendant shows on the balance of 
probabilities that owing to the delay he will suffer serious prejudice to the extent that no fair 
trial can be held: in other words, that the continuance of the prosecution amounts to a misuse 
of the process of the court’.32 In R v S (S P), however, the Court of Appeal stated: 
In our judgment, the discretionary decision whether or not to grant a stay as an abuse of 
process, because of delay, is an exercise in judicial assessment dependent on judgment rather 
than on any conclusion as to fact based on evidence. It is, therefore, potentially misleading to 
apply to the exercise of that discretion the language of burden and standard of proof, which is 
more apt to an evidence-based fact-finding process. Accordingly, we doubt whether, today, in 
the light of intervening authorities in relation to the exercise of judicial discretion, Lord Lane 
would have expressed himself as he did with regard to the burden and standard of proof.33 
The latter approach would appear consistent with recent judicial thinking in relation to the 
discretion to exclude prosecution evidence under section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal 
                                                          
31
 Jackson, J. and Johnstone, J. (2005). ‘The Reasonable Time Requirement: An Independent and Meaningful 
Right?’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 3, 23. 
32[1992] QB 630, 644. 
33[2006] EWCA Crim 756, [2006] 2 Cr App R 23 [20]. 
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Evidence Act 1984.34 In R (Saifi) v Governor of Brixton Prison,35 for example, the 
Administrative Court noted pragmatically that 
. . . [t]he power [conferred by section 78(1)] is to be exercised whenever an issue appears as 
towhether the court could conclude that the evidence should not be admitted. The conceptof a 
burden of proof has no part to play in such circumstances. No doubt it is for thatreason that 
there is no express provision as to the burden of proof, and we see no basis forimplying such a 
burden. The prosecution desiring to adduce and the defence seeking toexclude evidence will 
each seek to persuade the court about impact on fairness. We regardthe position as neutral and 
see no reason why section 78 should be understood as requiringthe court to consider upon 
whom the burden of proof rests.36 
Acceptance of such a view would not in any way affect the principle that any factual 
determination that is to form the basis of a decision on whether a stay should be granted must 
be governed by the usual rules governing the burden and standard of proof. Thus, the burden 
would be on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that any fact alleged to be 
relevant by the defence did not exist.37 
5.12 It is to be noted, however, that, notwithstanding R v S (S P), the case law on abuse of process 
continues to feature statements suggesting that it is for the defence to prove, on the balance of 
probabilities, that particular facts justify a stay of the proceedings. For example, the 
Administrative Court noted very recently, in the context of an abuse of process application on 
the basis of the non-availability of evidence: ‘If there is a breach of the obligation to obtain or 
retain the relevant material, it is . . . necessary to decide whether the defence has shown, on 
                                                          
34
 This provides: ‘In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes 
to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the 
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse 
effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.’ 
35[2001] 1 WLR 1134. 
36Ibid. [52]. 
37
 See further Choo, A. L.-T.(2008), cited above at n.6 (p.167). 
10 
 
balance of probabilities, that owing to the absence of the relevant material the defence will 
suffer serious prejudice to the extent that a fair trial cannot take place.’38 
5.13 Decisions of the Court of Appeal subsequent to R v F (S) – notably R v E,39 R v S (P),40 R v D 
(R),41 R v T (A),42 and R v Taylor43- have continued to take a similar line to that taken in R v F 
(S). In R v Taylor, for example, the Court stated: 
It is, we accept, undoubtedly true that the very considerable interval between the events 
covered by the indictment and the trial created disadvantages for the appellant. However, the 
trial process was fully capable of making due allowance for those difficulties and, properly 
directed, the jury was able, if appropriate, to reflect their judgment upon those difficulties in 
their verdicts.44 
E. Care warnings 
5.14 The Crown Court Bench Book provides the following guidance on the administration of care 
warnings pertaining to delay: 
                                                          
38Morris v DPP  [2014] EWHC 105 (Admin) [14]. R (Ebrahim) v Feltham Magistrates’ Court [2001] EWHC 
Admin 130, [2001] 1 WLR 1293 was endorsed. See also R v E [2012] EWCA Crim 791 [22]. Perhaps more 
troubling is the apparent suggestion in R v Moore[2013] EWCA Crim 85[75], in the context of a discussion of 
allegations of entrapment, that the defence must prove relevant facts on the balance of probabilities: ‘it must be 
recalled that the burden of proof is on the applicant defendant, albeit the standard is only that of the balance of 
probabilities. Unless the relevant facts are agreed, or are assumed for the purposes of argument, it may be 
necessary therefore for an applicant to give evidence in a voir dire, or to cross-examine the undercover officers 
as to their conduct or for there to be at least agreed assumptions as to the facts. If Ms Moore wished to say, as 
was submitted on her behalf, that it was a clear, albeit unspoken, premise of her relationship with the undercover 
officers that they were taking advantage of her vulnerability and innocence to lure her into offending by the 
temptation of cheap goods, and that the recordings of their conversations did not reflect the true circumstances 
as they had to be understood, then it was for her to initiate the necessary evidence and cross-examination.’ 
39[2012] EWCA Crim 791. 
40
 [2013] EWCA Crim 992. 
41
 [2013] EWCA Crim 1592. See generally Corker, D. (2013). ‘Delays and Historic Offences,’ 177 Criminal 
Law and Justice Weekly 836. 
42[2013] EWCA Crim 1850. 
43[2013] EWCA Crim 2398. 
44Ibid [79]. See alsoR v E [2012] EWCA Crim 791 [28] (‘In sum, no error of principle has been relied upon ... in 
this appeal, and no specific features of this case suggest that this was one of those exceptional cases where 
incurable prejudice has been caused, for which the judge’s conduct of the trial and directions to the jury cannot 
compensate, resulting in an unfair trial. We cannot say that the judge was wrong to consider that the appellant 
would be able to have a fair trial’); R v T (A) [2013] EWCA Crim 1850 [39] (‘We do not think that this was an 
exceptional case justifying the grant of a stay. The trial process was capable of dealing with the difficulties 
raised for the defence’); and, very recently, R v Downey (Central Criminal Court, 25 February 2014) (conclusion 
on first ground). 
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• The judge should refer to the fact that the passage of time is bound to affect 
memory. A witness’s inability to recall detail applies equally to prosecution and 
defence witnesses but it is the prosecution which bears the burden of proof. The jury 
may be troubled by the absence of circumstantial detail which, but for the delay, they 
would expect to be available. Conversely, the jury may be troubled by the witness’ 
claim to recall a degree of detail which is unlikely after such a prolonged passage of 
time. Whether reference should be made to such possibilities is a matter for the trial 
judge to assess having regard to the evidence and the issues which have arisen in the 
case. 
• If, as a result of delay, specific lines of inquiry have been closed to the defendant the 
disadvantage this presents should be identified and explained by reference to the 
burden of proof. 
• A defendant of good character will be able to assert that the absence of any further 
and similar allegation is significant. 
• Directions must make clear that the jury should give careful consideration to the 
exigencies of delay.45 
5.15 These, of course, are merely guidelines which are not intended to be prescriptive. 
Considerable leeway is accorded to trial judges in this field, and the Court of Appeal displays 
considerable reluctance to intervene.46 While the Court of Appeal has stressed the importance 
of care warnings in delay cases being tailored to the facts of the case,47there is a danger, as 
                                                          
45
 Judicial Studies Board (2010). Crown Court Bench Book: Directing the Jury, 33. 
46See, e.g., R v T (A) [2013] EWCA Crim 1850 [88]: ‘Looking at the position overall, we take the view that, 
while the summing-up should, to advantage, have alluded to the specific elements of prejudice said to have been 
occasioned to the applicant by reason of the delay, the failure to do so was not such as to render the convictions 
unsafe.’ 
47See, e.g., R v S (P) [2013] EWCA Crim 992 [24]: ‘On the basis of [the] authorities, it is self-evident that no 
two cases are the same and whether a direction on delay is to be given and the way in which it is formulated will 
depend on the facts of the case. We stress, therefore, that the need for a direction, its formulation and the matters 
to be included will depend on the circumstances of, and the issues arising in, the trial.’ See also R v T (A) [2013] 
EWCA Crim 1850 [88]: ‘It is, often, not desirable to provide simply a generalised formula as to possible 
12 
 
previous experience in Australia suggests, that the administration of such warnings may, in 
time, become ‘decontextualized’, taking insufficient account of the rationale for 
administering them orof the particular circumstances of individual cases. Because of fears in 
Australia that care warnings were suggesting that delay would inevitably create forensic 
disadvantage, the Australian uniform evidence legislation introduced a provision designed to 
halt this practice.48 This provision, section 165B,49 states that, if the court ‘is satisfied that the 
defendant has suffered a significant forensic disadvantage because of the consequences of 
delay, the court must inform the jury of the nature of that disadvantage and the need to take 
that disadvantage into account when considering the evidence’,50 ‘but the judge must not in 
any way suggest to the jury that it would be dangerous or unsafe to convict the defendant 
solely because of the delay or the forensic disadvantage suffered because of the consequences 
of the delay’,51 and ‘significant forensic disadvantage is not to be regarded as being 
established by the mere existence of a delay’.52 This ought to provide useful lessons for trial 
judges in England and Wales. 
F. Conclusion 
5.16 While R v F (S) is not immune to criticism, it helpfully clarifies aspects of the abuse of 
process doctrine as it applies in cases of delay, while emphasizing that stays are very rarely to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
prejudice by reason of delay – the formula should, where appropriate, be applied to the particular facts and 
particular prejudice identified as arising.’ 
48
 See generally Cossins, A. (2010). ‘Time Out for Longman: Myths, Science and the Common Law.’ 
Melbourne University Law Review, 34, 69; Gans, J., Henning, T., Hunter, J. and Warner, K. (2011). Criminal 
Process and Human Rights. Sydney: Federation Press, pp.474-81. 
49Recent considerations of s 165B may be found in KSC v R[2012] NSWCCA 179; Greensill v The Queen 
[2012] VSCA 306; Groundstroem v R [2013] NSWCCA 237. 
50Evidence Act 1995 (Commonwealth of Australia), s.165B(2);Evidence Act 1995 (New South Wales), 
s.165B(2); Evidence Act 2001 (Tasmania), s.165B(2); Evidence Act 2008 (Victoria), s.165B(2);Evidence Act 
2011 (Australian Capital Territory), s.165B(2); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (Northern 
Territory), s.165B(2). 
51Evidence Act 1995 (Commonwealth of Australia), s.165B(4); Evidence Act 1995 (New South Wales), 
s.165B(4); Evidence Act 2001 (Tasmania), s.165B(4); Evidence Act 2008 (Victoria), s.165B(4); Evidence Act 
2011 (Australian Capital Territory), s.165B(4); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (Northern 
Territory), s.165B(4). 
52Evidence Act 1995 (Commonwealth of Australia), s.165B(6)(b); Evidence Act 1995 (New South Wales), 
s.165B(6)(b); Evidence Act 2001 (Tasmania), s.165B(6)(b); Evidence Act 2008 (Victoria), s.165B(6)(b); 
Evidence Act 2011 (Australian Capital Territory), s.165B(6)(b); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 
2011 (Northern Territory), s.165B(6)(b). 
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be granted. One commentator has remarked that ‘it seems that [the only] abuse submission 
with a good chance of gaining traction with the court is one where the specificity of the 
allegation allows for the mounting of either a quasi-alibi defence or one where the absence of 
a witness or document can demonstrably be shown to have caused prejudice’.53The strategy 
of relying where possible on care warnings, rather than preventing thecase from going to the 
jury altogether,54is consistent with the trend in the law of evidence towards ‘trusting the jury’ 
to evaluate evidence the reliability of which may be in doubt, rather than excluding that 
evidence from the jury’s consideration altogether.55 Caution must be exercised, however, to 
ensure that care warnings do not become a substitute for stays in circumstances where 
nothing short of a stay would suffice to provide the defendant with adequate protection from 
the risk of wrongful conviction stemming from delay. 
 
Further reading list 
Corker, D. (2013). ‘Delays and Historic Offences,’ 177 Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 836 
Samuels, A. (2013). ‘Abuse of Process Applications – A Tougher Stance’. 177 Criminal Law and 
Justice Weekly 154 
Young, D., Summers,  M. and Corker, D. (2014). Abuse of Process in Criminal Proceedings. 4th 
edn, Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury Professional 
 
                                                          
53
 Corker, D. (2013), cited above at n.41; R v E [2012] EWCA Crim 791 and, very recently, R v Dent[2014] 
EWCA Crim 457, both of which are decisions in which the Court if Appeal held that the relevant abuse 
applications had rightly failed, illustrate this point well. 
54Such a strategy has been endorsed by Dingwall, G. (1996). ‘Protecting the Accused and Delay in Sexual 
Abuse Cases.’  King’s College Law Journal, 7,  132, 135: ‘The reluctance to stay proceedings due to a general 
prejudice caused by delay, ... and the preference of leaving the matter to the jury, with suitable direction where 
necessary, is, it is suggested, the optimum way of ensuring that complainants who have delayed making 
accusations and defendants facing difficulties in obtaining exculpatory evidence receive a fair hearing.’ 
55See, eg, Stein, A. (2005). Foundations of Evidence Law. Oxford: OUP, 107, who writes of the idea of ‘free 
evaluation of evidence (or free proof). This idea is ... influential amongst practitioners, law reformers, and legal 
scholars. The endorsement of this idea by law reformers (both legislative and judicial) is responsible for the 
ongoing abolition of evidentiary rules and the flowering of discretion in adjudicative fact-finding. The 
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